Remember judgments and the constraint of direct experience.
The most direct assessment of episodic memory is provided by Remember versus Know judgments of recalled or recognised items. We investigate whether Remember judgments reflect episodic memories as a re-experience of formerly experienced events (mental time travel). If they do, they must obey the direct experience constraint: only directly experienced events can be re-experienced but not when the event is known through indirectly conveyed information. In two Experiments participants saw simple events in Power Point, e.g. a car exploding. In the direct experience condition these events were directly perceived. In three further conditions information about the object (particular car), the kind of event (explosion), or both were verbally conveyed. After controlling for a potential encoding specificity effect in Experiment 1, the frequency of Remember judgments was twice as high in the direct experience condition than in the other three conditions. This suggests that Remember judgments are--at least to some degree--subject to the direct experience constraint.